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In human cognition, self and memory processes strongly interact, as evidenced by the 
memory advantage for self-referential materials (Self Reference Effect (SRE) and Self 
Reference Recollection Effect (SRRE)). The current study examined this interaction at the 
behavioural level and its neural correlates in patients with Alzheimer’s disease (AD).  Healthy 
older controls (HC) and AD patients performed trait-adjectives judgements either for self-
relevance or for other-relevance (encoding phase). In a first experiment, the encoding and 
subsequent yes-no recognition phases were administrated in an MRI scanner. Brain activation 
as measured by fMRI was examined during self-relevance judgements and anatomical images 
were used to search for correlation between the memory advantage for self-related items and 
grey matter density (GMD). In a second experiment, participants described the retrieval 
experience that had driven their recognition decisions (familiarity vs. recollective experience). 
The behavioural results revealed that the SRE and SRRE were impaired in AD patients 
compared to HC participants. Furthermore, verbal reports revealed that the retrieval of self-
related information was preferentially associated with the retrieval of contextual details, such 
as source memory in the HC participants, but less so in the AD patients. Our imaging findings 
revealed that both groups activated the medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) at encoding during 
self-relevance judgments. However, the variable and limited memory advantage for self-
related information was associated with GMD in the lateral prefrontal cortex in the AD 
patients, a region supporting high-order processes linking self and memory. These findings 
suggest that even if AD patients engage MPFC during self-referential judgments, the retrieval 
of self-related memories is qualitatively and quantitatively impaired in relation with altered 


















The concept of self has received much attention during the last decade. Current theoretical 
views suggest that despite a phenomenal appearance of unity, the self is actually made of 
several components. According to Klein & Gangi (2010), the self is formed by different, 
functionally isolable components including, notably, episodic memories of one’s life events 
and semantic summary representations of one’s personality traits. The multiplicity of 
functionally isolable cognitive components implies that the self might be supported by several 
brain regions each specialised in one aspect and that some aspects of the self may be 
preserved while others are impaired in neurocognitive pathologies (Klein & Gangi, 2010; 
Martinelli et al, in press). In this view, Damasio (1999; see also Northoff et al., 2006) 
distinguished three main systems: the “proto self” that refers to a “bodily-self”, the “core self” 
which supports the discrimination of self-related stimuli from self-unrelated stimuli, and the 
“autobiographical self” which reflects the linkage of self-referential stimuli to the memory 
domain. The “core-self” is supramodal and receive afferent connections from all sensory 
modalities. It allows for an active and explicit distinction between self and non-self-related 
intero- and exteroceptive stimuli. In contrast, the “autobiographical self” is related to high-
order cognitive processes. Actually, the authors proposed that the core self filters, selects, and 
provides those stimuli that are relevant for a particular person’s self. Only self-related stimuli 
are then elaborated further by higher-order processing (i.e., in the autobiographical self). The 
interaction between the self and memory has also been conceptualised in the Self-Memory 
System (SMS; Conway and Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Conway, 2005). The SMS contains two 
main components: the working self and the autobiographical knowledge base. The working 














manages the encoding and controlled retrieval of information in and from the 
autobiographical knowledge base.  
 
Strong evidence for the interaction between self and long-term memory can be found in 
studies using laboratory self-referential materials. Indeed, in these studies, retrieval 
performance is better for information that has been encoded in reference to the self than for 
information that has been processed semantically or in reference to other people. This well-
known cognitive phenomenon, named the Self Reference Effect (SRE; Rogers et al., 1977), is 
a strong characteristic of human cognition since it has been observed in various populations 
including healthy older people (Gutchess et al., 2007), with various materials and various 
paradigms at encoding and recognition and with different designs (for a review see Symons 
and Johnson, 1997).       
 
This interaction between self and long-term memory seems to be mediated by complex 
cognitive mechanisms. Self-reference at encoding may promote elaborate and organized 
processing, leading to a memory representation having item-specific and relational 
information (Symons & Johnson, 1997; Klein, 2012). At retrieval, such deeply encoded 
information would promote recollection (i.e. controlled and conscious episodic retrieval of 
information together with the context and elaborations from encoding (Tulving, 2002) rather 
than familiarity (i.e. a relatively automatic process of global assessment of memory strength 
or stimulus fluency (for reviews, see Yonelinas, 2002 and Yonelinas et al., 2010)). In support 
of this hypothesis, several authors have shown that the retrieval of information associated to 
the self is more likely to be associated with a recollection-based retrieval as reflected by 
recollective experience (as assessed by the Remember/Know procedure (Tulving, 1985; 














Carroll et al., 2001; Van den Bos et al., 2010). This phenomenon, termed the Self Reference 
Recollection Effect (SRRE, Conway et al., 2001), suggests that recollection-based processes 
support episodic retrieval of information that has been previously associated to the self.  
 
Alzheimer’s disease (AD) is characterized by impaired recollection-based processes, such as 
controlled retrieval (Knight, 1998; Smith and Knight, 2002; Adam et al., 2005; Genon, 
Collette, Feyers et al., 2013) and experience of remembering  (Dalla Barba, 1997; Rauchs et 
al., 2007). In the same line, the quality of the recollective experience for autobiographical 
memories is impaired in AD patients (Irish, Hornberger, et al.,  2011; Irish, Lawlor, et al.,  
2011; Piolino et al.,  2003). In particular, AD patients are impaired across a range of 
behavioural characteristics inherent to recollective experience, such as self-referential 
imagery, vividness and retrieval of contextual details (Irish, Hornberger, et al.,  2011; Irish, 
Lawlor, et al.,  2011). In summary, these findings suggest that most aspects of recollection-
based retrieval, i.e. episodic retrieval, are impaired in AD patients.  
 
In this context, if the retrieval of self-referential information is primarily supported by 
recollection-related processes (i.e. episodic retrieval), one may assume that it is impaired in 
AD. More precisely, the impairment of the recollective experience in AD may lead to poor 
retrieval of self-referential information at the quantitative and qualitative levels, so that 
patients do not benefit from encoding information in reference to themselves. In other words, 
one may expect the SRRE and SRE, i.e. interaction between self and memory, to be altered in 
AD patients. To our knowledge, three studies have investigated the SRE and the SRRE in AD 
patients. The results of these studies suggest that SRE and SRRE, at the group level, may be 
relatively preserved when driven by emotional material in AD patients (Lalanne et al., 2010; 














may, in some cases, promote relational encoding and therefore recollection-based processes at 
retrieval, in particular, retrieval of contextual details (Carroll et al., 2001) in AD patients. 
However, to our knowledge, the quality of retrieval experience has never been rigorously 
examined in AD patients for information encoded in reference to the self.       
 
In healthy young populations, judgments about the self are known to engage cortical midline 
structures such as the medial prefrontal cortex (MPC; D’Argembeau et al., 2005; 
D’Argembeau et al., 2007; for a review see Northoff et al., 2006). According to Northoff et al. 
(2006), the ventral part of the MPFC discriminates self-related stimuli from self-unrelated 
stimuli, hence supporting the core self. As stated above, this self-referential processing filters, 
selects, and provides those stimuli which are relevant for a particular person’s self. Some 
studies investigated the neural correlates of this self-referential processing (i.e. the core self) 
in MCI and AD patients and suggested that, in many conditions, patients’ brain functioning 
was modified during this process (Ruby et al., 2009; Zamboni et al., 2012). The core self 
might thus be altered in AD patients.  
 
According to Northoff et al. (2006), only self-referential stimuli (selected by the core self) are 
elaborated further in higher-order processing, such as autobiographical memory/self. 
Considering that lateral frontal regions (such as the inferior frontal gyrus) have also been 
found to be engaged during self-referential processing (for a review see Northoff et al., 2006 
and Qin & Northoff, 2011) and given their typical involvement in tasks with strong demands 
(e.g. tasks requiring verbal monitoring or inference and involving emotions), it was suggested 
that lateral frontal engagement is related to higher order processing such as autobiographical 
memory/self (Northoff et al., 2006). Thus, the interaction between self and memory might be 














support of this hypothesis, two studies have found that the subsequent memory effect for 
items encoded in reference to the self was related to brain activation in the MPFC and the 
lateral frontal cortex (anterior prefrontal cortex and superior frontal gyrus) at encoding 
(Macrae et al., 2004; Leshikar and Duarte, 2012).  
 
Little is known about the brain correlates of the subsequent memory benefit for self-related 
items (beyond the encoding phase). Different methodologies may serve to examine this 
question. First, one can examine brain regions engaged during the retrieval of items encoded 
in reference to the self. To our knowledge, this has been done in only one study. The authors 
found that retrieval of items that had been encoded in reference to the self was related to brain 
activation in the posterior cingulate cortex (PCC) in healthy young adults (Leshikar & Duarte, 
2012). The PCC has been found to play a role in both episodic retrieval (Genon, Collette, 
Feyers et al., 2013) and self-related processes (D’Argembeau et al., 2008; for a review see 
Andrews-Hanna, 2012). Therefore, the PCC could potentially play a role in the retrieval of 
self-related information in episodic memory. Second, the brain correlates of the subsequent 
memory benefit for self-related items might be explored by performing correlation analysis 
between the amplitude of the self-reference effect and variations in local brain functional 
activity or in local grey matter density. This analysis can only be achieved in populations in 
which there are large inter-subjects variations, both in the amplitude of the SRE and in brain 
activity and/or grey matter density. This approach would be particularly appropriate for 
neurodegenerative disease.  
 
The present study had two main objectives, which led us to design two tasks. Both tasks 
included two encoding conditions: one engaging self-referential processing and the other 














regions related to encoding and retrieval of items in reference to the self and to quantitative 
retrieval performance for these traits, that is, the SRE, in AD patients. To this aim, a “self-
recognition task” was administered during a functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) 
acquisition. In this task, the SRE effect was assessed by administering a yes/no recognition 
task. The discrepancy between retrieval performance for items that have been processed with 
self-reference and retrieval performance for items that have been processed with other-
reference provided an estimation of the SRE, that is, memory advantage for self-related items, 
in each participant (cf. Philippi et al., 2012). This estimation of SRE was subsequently 
correlated with brain regional grey matter density and functional activity. The second aim of 
this study was to finely examine the quality of the retrieval of information that has been 
associated to the self in AD patients, that is, the SRRE, including the amount of details related 
to the trace. To this aim, a “self-recollection task” was administered to the participants. In this 
task, the SRRE was assessed by a modified Remember/Know recognition procedure in which 
patients provided detailed verbal reports on the experienced retrieval process. The latter 
procedure had two potential advantages. First, it could improve the accuracy of the rating of 
Remember and Know responses in patients with severe memory impairment. Second, it 
allows examining the qualitative profile of memory retrieval in the participants. Since both 
tasks were administrated to the same samples of participants, two different sets of adjectives 
were used for the two tasks. 
 
Since the SRE might depend on the organization and elaboration of the memory trace 
promoting recollection-based retrieval (i.e. episodic retrieval) for self-related information and 
since episodic memory is impaired in AD patients, we expected (1) the SRE and SRRE to be 
impaired in AD patients and (2) the retrieval profile of self-related information in healthy 














such as richness of associated details or source memory, to a greater extent than in AD 
patients. Furthermore, at the brain functional level, we expected that the retrieval of 
information encoded in reference to the self would be related to altered brain activation in the 
episodic memory network. In particular, the PCC and the hippocampus show early 
perturbations in AD patients (Salmon et al., 2008; Salmon et al., 2009) and are related to 
episodic memory deficits in these patients (Genon, Collette, Moulin et al., 2013; Irish et al., in 
press). Finally, according to Northoff’s model, we expected that decreases in SRE would be 







This study included 21 healthy older control adults (HC) and 21 patients diagnosed with 
probable AD at a mild stage according to the National Institute of Neurological and 
Communicative Disorders and Stroke/Alzheimer’s disease and Related Disorders Association 
(NINCDS-ADRDA) criteria (McKhann et al., 1984). Patients were recruited in the Memory 
Clinic of the University Hospital of Liège (Belgium). The diagnosis was based on a clinical 
interview with the patient and a caregiver, and on neurological and neuropsychological 
examinations. Patients had FDG-PET as a biomarker, and probable AD diagnosis was 
consistent with new NINCDS-ADRDA’s criteria (McKhann et al., 2011). HC were recruited 
from seniors’ organisations in Liège and were paid 15€ for their participation. Ethical 
approval was obtained from the ethics committee of the University Hospital of Liège and each 














participate to the study in line with the Declaration of Helsinki. Twelve patients received an 
acetylcholinesterase inhibitor, 5 patients took ginkgo biloba and 4 patients had no drug 
treatment for the AD symptoms. 
The main demographic and clinical data of the participants are summarized in Table 1. 
Gender was similarly distributed amongst probable AD and HC groups (χ2 = .38; p = .54). 
Groups were similar with regard to age [t(40) = .08; p = .93] and years spent in formal 
education [t(40) = .05; p = .96]. Depressive symptoms were assessed in all participants with 
the 15-item Geriatric Depression Scale (GDS; Yesavage et al., 1983). The GDS scores were 
similar in probable AD patients and in HC group [t(40) = .19; p = .85]. Participants were 
assessed with the Mattis dementia rating scale (Mattis, 1973) and performance was 
significantly lower in probable AD patients than in HC [t(35) = -6.53; p < .000001]. In 
addition, AD patients were assessed with the Mini-Mental State Examination (MMSE, 
Folstein et al., 1975) for clinical purposes, and mild dementia was an inclusion criterion. 
Three AD patients and one HC participant did not take part to the second experimental part 
(i.e. the self-recollection task).   
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
2.2. Materials  
The most frequent 350 words were extracted from Dumas et al.’s (2002) list of person-
descriptive words and translated into French. Two adjectives were used as examples during 
the instructions, 24 adjectives were used in the first practice trials of the self-recognition and 
self-recollection tasks, and 12 adjectives served in the second practice trials of the self-
recognition task. The Self-recognition task comprises 216 adjectives and the Self-recollection 














6.1. (Mathworks Inc., Sherborn, MA). The stimuli of the self-recognition and self-recollection 
tasks were comparable in terms of words length [respectively 8.14 (2.40) and 8.33 (2.21); 
t(310) = -.69; p = .49], likability [respectively 3.48 (1.39) and 3.51 (1.38); t(310) = -.16; p = 
.88], familiarity [respectively 5.64 (.36) and 5.57 (.46); t(310) = 1.34; p = .18] and frequency 
[respectively 31.85 (93.35) and 18.84 (26.48); t(310) = 1.33; p  = .18] according to Kucera 
and Francis norms (Kucera & Francis, 1967).  
 
2.3. Experimental tasks 
For both tasks, in the encoding phase, each adjective was shown for 5 sec to the participants 
in the middle of a computer screen. The adjectives were always presented in the lexical form 
that coincided with the gender of the participant. In the self-condition, the participants had to 
indicate for each trait whether or not it described the self. In the other-condition, the 
participants had to indicate for each trait whether or not it described King Albert II (for male 
participants) or Queen Fabiola (for female participants). King Albert II and Queen Fabiola 
were selected for the other condition since they are famous persons in Belgium and were in 
the same category of age as the participants (King Albert II was 77 years old at the time of the 
study and Queen Fabiola was 83 years old). The procedure consisted in a series of study-test 
runs (9 for the self-recognition task and 4 for the self-recollection task). For each run, 6 
adjectives were presented in each condition (self and other, some runs began with the self 
condition whereas other runs began with the other condition, in such a way that self and other 
conditions were counterbalanced in the runs). The participants pressed yes/no keyboard 
buttons with (respectively) the index finger/middle finger to indicate their response. The 
encoding phase was followed by a recognition phase after an interval of 10 seconds. Although 
participants knew that the encoding phase would be followed by a recognition phase, they 














requested judgments. In the recognition phase, the 12 adjectives seen in the encoding phase 
were intermixed with 12 new adjectives. The adjectives were presented in the middle of the 
screen. For each adjective, the participants had to indicate whether or not they had seen the 
adjective in the encoding phase. There were 2 counterbalanced lists such that each adjective 
served as an old and a new item across participants. The recognition phase was followed by a 
rest of 5 seconds. A short instruction screen was presented before each condition (Self-
relevance, Other-relevance and Recognition) for 5 seconds and the question asked to the 
participants was displayed above the adjective, on the top of the screen, for each condition 
(respectively “Are-you…?, “Is Albert-II/Fabiola…?” and “Have you seen…?”). The 
procedure for the encoding and recognition sessions is illustrated in Figure 1.       
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
2.3.1. Self-recognition task 
The self-recognition task was administrated in a 3-T Magnetic Resonance Imaging scanner 
(scanner description is given below) while acquiring T2*-weighted functional images at the 
Cyclotron Research Centre, University of Liège, Belgium. The participants performed 9 runs 
consisting in one block of Self-relevance and one block of Other-relevance followed by a 
recognition phase. In the recognition phases, the participant had to indicate for each adjective 
(within an interval of 8 seconds) whether they had seen it or not in the encoding phase by 
pressing a yes/no button.   
Recognition accuracy for the items encoded in reference to the Self (Self_accuracy) were 
computed as the rate of hits for items that have been processed in self-reference minus the rate 














reference to Other (Other_accuracy) were computed as the rate of hits for items that have 
been processed in reference to other minus the rate of false alarm on new items.  
Furthermore, in order to obtain an estimation of the SRE in each participant, the difference 
between Self-accuracy and Other_accuracy was calculated for each participant based on the 
method used by Philippi et al. (2012). One may reasonably consider that the higher the 
difference, the greater the advantage of self compared to other on memory performance. 
Values close to zero are supposed to reflect no advantage of self compared to other on 
memory performance (Philippi et al., 2012).   
 
2.3.2. Self-recollection task 
This task was administered one to four week(s) after the self-recognition task, at the 
participant’s home. As stated above, this task used a different set of adjectives than the set 
used in the self-recognition task. The participants performed 4 runs consisting in one block of 
self-relevance encoding and one block of other-relevance encoding followed by a recognition 
phase. To assess the states of consciousness associated with the retrieval of the items, we used 
a procedure derived from the traditional Remember/Know procedure (Tulving, 1985; 
Gardiner, 1988). In traditional Remember/Know procedure, participants are asked to classify 
as “Remember” items that they recognize through recollection of some episodic details of the 
encoding context and to indicate “Know” if they have a feeling of familiarity without any 
contextual information. Some authors reported inadequate understanding of the distinction 
between the two types of responses in patients with severe episodic memory impairment 
(Baddeley et al., 2001; Bastin et al., 2004). Other authors have demonstrated the influence of 
the instructions and the terminology on the accuracy of the participant’s answer (McCabe & 
Geraci, 2009) and have argued that asking participants to provide a verbal report on a 














memory retrieval than traditional R/K procedure (McCabe et al., 2011). Therefore, we 
adapted the procedure by training an experimenter to accurately classify participants’ 
subjective report into the R/K categories. Second, since we were interested in the quality of 
the recollective experience as assessed by the details remembered from the encoding context, 
the content of retrieval was further probed by an adapted version of Johnson et al.’s (1988) 
Memory Characteristic Questionnaire (MCQ). However, since the MCQ is designed to assess 
autobiographical events, we selected the most relevant criteria for an episodic experimental 
task. Thus, in this task, when the participants indicated that they had seen an adjective 
previously, they were asked to describe (without a time limit) the cognitive experience that 
had driven their answer. Concretely, for each item that the participants indicated having seen 
previously, the experimenter asked whether they could remember 1) the encoding condition in 
which they had seen it (that is, the source of encoding, self-relevance versus other-relevance, 
condition), 2) the answer they had given when they had seen the item in the encoding session 
(answer), 3) a thought or a mental image that they had experienced when they had seen the 
item in the encoding session (thought), 4) an emotion that they had experienced when they 
had seen the item in the encoding session (emotion), 5) an episode/a memory of their life that 
they had retrieved when they had seen the item in the encoding session (memory), 6) the 
temporal position of the item in the encoding session (temporal context), or 7) any other detail 
related to the presentation of the given item in the encoding session such as a sound that 
attracted their attention when the item has been presented (other). If the participant was able 
to give at least one detail from the encoding context (either during spontaneous verbal report 
or during the adapted MCQ), the experimenter rated the answer as “Remember”. If the 
participant reported a feeling of knowing the item without being able to provide any detail 
from the encoding context, the experimenter rated the answer as “Know”. Finally, if the 














percentages of Remember, Know and Guess responses were corrected for corresponding false 
alarm rates, i.e. respectively the percentages of Remember, Know and Guess responses given 
to new items. The Remember and Know responses were first combined to examine global 
accuracy for items that have been encoded in reference to the self and items that have been 
encoded in reference to other and therefore to examine whether it replicated the profile of 
global accuracy found with the self-recognition task. Then, the percentages of Remember and 
Know responses were analysed separately to examine the effect of self-reference on these 
responses. According to independence models of recollection and familiarity (Yonelinas & 
Jacoby, 1995), probabilities for correct Know judgments and false alarms with Know 
responses were estimated respectively using the following formulae: pc(Hits-Know) = p(Hits-
Know)/(1-p(Hits-Remember) and pc(False alarms-Know) = p(False alarms-Know)/(1-p(False 
alarms-Remember). Then pc(Hits-Know) were corrected for pc(False alarms-Know): F = 
pc(Hits-Know) - pc(False alarms-Know). Thus, F scores refer to familiarity estimates under 
the assumption of independence.     
In the qualitative analysis of the remembered details for old items, the reported responses for 
“condition” and “answer” were compared to the actual condition and answer given by the 
participant in the encoding session. Only the responses that accurately reflect the encoding 
session were taken into account. Inaccurately remembered “condition” and “answer” details 
for old items were computed as, respectively, “false remembered condition” and “false 
remembered answer”. All type of details (correct and false) provided by the participants were 
expressed as percentages of the total number of Remember responses on old items.  
 
2.4. Images acquisition 
Functional data were acquired on a 3 Tesla scanner (Siemens, Allegra, Erlangen, Germany) 














FoV = 220x220 mm2, matrix size = 64x64, voxel size = 3x3x3 mm³). Thirty-four 3-mm thick 
transverse slices were acquired, with an interslice gap of 25%, covering the whole brain. The 
first three volumes were discarded to allow for magnetization equilibrium. A gradient-recalled 
sequence was applied directly after the functional acquisition to acquire two complex images 
with different echo times (TE = 4.92 and 7.38 ms respectively) and generate field maps for 
distortion correction of the echo-planar images (EPI). A structural MR scan was obtained at 
the end for each participant (T1-weighted 3D MP-RAGE sequence, TR = 1960 ms, TE = 4.4 
ms, FoV = 230 x 173 mm², matrix size 384x512x176, voxel size 0.45x0.45x0.9 mm3).  
Head movement was minimised by restraining the subject’s head using a vacuum cushion. 
Stimuli were displayed on a screen positioned at the rear of the scanner, which the subject 
could comfortably see through a mirror mounted on the standard head coil. 
 
2.5. Images analyses 
2.5.1. Pre-processing 
Preprocessing and analysis of imaging data were performed using SPM8 (Wellcome 
Department of Imaging Neuroscience, http//www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm) implemented in 
MATLAB 6.1. (Mathworks Inc., Sherborn, MA). For each subject, EPI time series were 
corrected for motion and distortion using Realign and Unwarp (Andersson et al., 2001) 
together with the FieldMap toolbox (Hutton et al., 2002) in SPM8. Functional scans were 
realigned using rigid body transformations, iteratively optimised to minimise the residual sum 
of squares between the first and each subsequent image separately and a mean realigned 
functional image was then calculated by averaging all the realigned functional scans. This 
mean functional image was coregistered to the structural T1-image using a rigid body 
transformation optimised to maximise the normalised mutual information between the two 














images. The mapping from subject to MNI space was estimated from the structural image 
using the ‘unified segmentation’ approach (Ashburner and Friston, 2005). The warping 
parameters were then separately applied to the functional and structural images to produce 
normalised images of resolution 2x2x2 mm3 and 1x1x1 mm3 respectively. Finally, the warped 
functional images were spatially smoothed using a Gaussian kernel of 8 mm full-width at half 
maximum (FWHM).  
 
2.5.2. Functional analysis 
For each participant, BOLD signal were modelled at each voxel, using a general linear model. 
Nine regressors were defined to cover the two tasks (encoding and recognition). That is, for 
the encoding task, we distinguished the two encoding conditions (self_relevance vs 
other_relevance) whereas for recognition trials, we distinguished the item status and the types 
of responses (self_hits, self_miss, other_hits, other_miss, new_correct rejection and new 
false_alarm) and non-responses. The design matrix also included the realignment parameters 
to account for any residual movement-related effect. Regressors were convolved with the 
canonical HRF. A high-pass filter at a cut-off period of 128 sec was used in order to remove 
the low-frequency drifts from the time series. Serial autocorrelations were estimated with a 
restricted maximum likelihood algorithm with an autoregressive model of order 1 (plus white 
noise). 
Two main linear contrasts were performed: one to examine brain activity associated to 
judgments of adjectives in reference to the self by subtracting brain activity related to 
other_relevance trials from brain activity related to self_relevance trials (self_relevance 
compared to other_relevance) and the other to examine brain activity associated to correct 














activity related to other_hits from brain activity related to self_hits (self_hits compared to 
other_hits).  
First-level analyses of individual participants’ data were conducted using a fixed-effect 
approach. The corresponding contrast images were smoothed (6-mm FWHM Gaussian 
kernel) in order to reduce the remaining noise due to inter-subject differences in anatomical 
variability. The resulting contrast images were then entered in a second-level analysis, 
corresponding to a random-effect model. Direct comparisons between the HC and AD groups 
were performed to examine brain activations that differ in the two groups. A conjunction 
analysis between the two groups was also performed to reveal brain regions activated by both 
the patients and the control participants.  
In order to examine whether activity changes in VMPFC during self-relevance judgements of 
items were related to subsequent memory advantage for these items (i.e. SRE), we defined a 
volume of interest in the VMPFC by drawing a 8 mm radius sphere around the peak of 
activation in our task (MNI coordinates: -12 42 -4). Then, t values extracted from the contrast 
image (self_relevance vs. other_relevance) in VMPFC were tested for correlation with an 
estimation of SRE in each participant.  
 
2.5.3. Structural analysis  
For each participant, the structural MRI image was segmented using the Voxel Based 
Morphometry (VBM8) toolbox (Structural Brain Mapping Group, Christian Gaser, 
Department of Psychiatry, University of Jena, Germany) and normalised to the MNI 
stereotactic space. The obtained grey matter density images were smoothed (8 mm FWHM 
Gaussian kernel) and introduced into a simple regression design in SPM8 in order to examine 














each participant was introduced as a confounding variable in the design matrix in order to 
account for heterogeneity in global brain volume. 
    
2.5.4. Statistical threshold  
The statistical threshold was set at P < .05 FWE-corrected for multiple comparisons or P 
<.001 uncorrected for multiple comparisons with a-priori hypotheses (self-related and 




3.1. Behavioural results  
3.1.1 Self-recognition task 
Global accuracy. The mean percentages of Self_accuracy (hits minus false alarms), 
Other_accuracy (hits minus false alarms) and correct rejections for new items (New_CR) in 
each group are shown in Table 2. A 2 (Group) by 2 (Condition: Self vs. Other) mixed analysis 
of variance (ANOVA) on Self_accuracy and Other_accuracy as repeated measures revealed a 
main effect of group [F(1,40) = 47.01; p < .000001.; 2pη = .54], a main effect of the encoding 
condition [F(1,40) = 27.17; p < .00001; 2pη =.40] and a significant group by condition 
interaction [F(1,40) = 10.88; p < .01; 2pη = .21]. These results are illustrated in Figure 2. A 
post-hoc analysis (Tukey’s test) revealed that the percentages of Self_accuracy and 
Other_accuracy were significantly lower in the AD group than in the HC group (both ps 
<.001). In addition, whereas in the HC group the percentage of Self_accuracy was 














AD group, the percentages of Self_accuracy and Other_accuracy were similar (p = .54), 
indicating an absence of SRE. 
 
[Table 2 and Figure 2 about here] 
 
Individual profiles. Estimation of SRE by the difference between Self-accuracy and 
Other_accuracy in each participant revealed that whereas 81% of the HC participants had 
more hits for the items that had been processed in reference to the self (discrepancy between 
self_accuracy and other_accuracy ranging from 5 to 19), only 43% of the AD patients showed 
this profile of memory advantage for self-related items (discrepancy between self_accuracy 
and other_accuracy ranging from 2 to 15). Thus, in other words, 81% of the HC participants 
showed a SRE, compared to only 43% of the AD patients. Noteworthy, correlation analyses 
revealed that this inter-individual variability in SRE was not related to variability in general 
cognitive/dementia level (as reflected by scores at the Mattis Dementia Rating Scale) neither 
in AD patients (r = .12; p = .64) nor in HC (r = -.06; p = .80).   
 
3.1.2. Self-recollection task 
 Global Accuracy (computation of the percentages of Remember plus Know responses minus 
false alarms). The mean percentages of Self_accuracy, Other_accuracy and correct rejections 
for new items (New_CR) in each group are detailed in Table 3. A 2 (Group) by 2 (Condition: 
Self vs. Other) mixed analysis of variance (ANOVA) on Self_accuracy and Other_accuracy 
as repeated measures revealed a main effect of group [F(1,36) = 38.75; p < .000001; 2pη = 
.52], a main effect of the encoding condition [F(1,36) = 21.18; p <. 0001; 2pη = .37] and a 
significant group by condition interaction [F(1,36) = 8.58; p < .01; 2pη = .19]. A post-hoc 














Other_accuracy were significantly lower in the AD group than in the HC group (both ps < 
.001). In addition, whereas the HC group had greater Self_accuracy was significantly higher 
than Other_accuracy (p <. 001), in the AD group, the percentages of Self_accuracy and 
Other_accuracy were similar (p = .66). Thus, at the quantitative level (accuracy), the results of 
the self-recollection task replicated the results obtained with the self-recognition task, namely, 
HC participants showed a SRE at the group level, but AD patients did not.    
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
Remember-Know responses. The percentages of Guess responses (calculated as hits minus 
false alarms) were very low (range of corrected percentages: -6.25 – 4.17 % in the whole 
sample of participants) and, therefore, the analyses were not performed on these responses. 
The mean percentages of Remember responses for items that have been encoded in reference 
to the self (Self_R) and in reference to other (Other_R) in each group are detailed in Figure 3. 
A 2 (Group) by 2 (Condition: Self vs. Other) mixed analysis of variance (ANOVA) on 
corrected Remember responses (hits – false alarms) as repeated measures revealed a main 
effect of group [F(1,36) = 36.63; p <. 00001; 2pη = .50], a main effect of the encoding 
condition [F(1,36) = 21.78; p < .0001; 2pη = .38] and a significant interaction [F(1,36) = 
15.28; p < .001; 2pη = .30]. A post-hoc analysis (Tukey’s test) revealed that the percentages of 
Self_R and Other_R were significantly lower in the AD group than in the HC group (both ps 
< .001). In addition, whereas the HC group had more Self_R than Other_R responses (p <. 
001), indicating a SRRE, in the AD group, the percentages of Self_R and Other_R were 
similar (p = .95), indicating an absence of SRRE. Estimates of familiarity (F) for the items 
encoded in reference to the Self and in reference to Other in each group are illustrated in 














on estimates of familiarity revealed no main effect of group [F(1,36) = .02; p < .88. 2pη = .00], 
no main effect of the encoding condition [F(1,36) = .99; p = .33. 2pη = .03] and no interaction 
[F(1,36) = .61; p = .44. 2pη = .02]. Thus, these results confirmed that, in healthy participants, 
self-reference at encoding had a subsequent effect only on recollection-based retrieval and not 
on familiarity-based retrieval. In contrast, in AD patients, self-reference had no effect, neither 
on recollection-based performance nor on familiarity-based retrieval.   
 
[Figure 3 about here] 
 
Remembered details. The percentages of remembered “emotion”, “memory”, “temporal 
context” and “other” details provided by the participants were very low (means ranging from 
0 to 3 percents in both groups), therefore no statistical analysis was performed on these 
responses. The mean percentages of remembered condition, answer and thought details 
(expressed as percentages of the total number of Remember responses on old items) in each 
group are illustrated in Figure 4. A 2 (Group) by 2 (Condition) by 3 (Type of details) 
ANOVA on the percentages of remembered condition, answer and thought revealed a main 
effect of group [F(1,34) = 38.64 ; p < .000001; 2pη = .53], a main effect of condition [F(1,34) 
= 17.46; p < .00001; 2pη = .34], a main effect of type of details [F(2,68) = 34.33; p < .000001; 
2
pη = .50] and a significant group by condition interaction [F(1,34) = 5.53; p < .05; 2pη = .14]. 
Other interactions were not significant. A post-hoc analysis (Tukey’s test) revealed that in the 
HC group, the percentages of remembered condition, answer and thought for the items that 
had been encoded in reference to the self were significantly higher than respectively, the 
percentages of remembered condition, answer and thought for the items that had been 














contextual retrieval. In contrast, in the AD group, there was no between-condition difference 
on the percentages of remembered condition, answer and thought, indicating no effect of self-
reference on contextual retrieval.  
 
[Figure 4 about here] 
 
A 2 (Group) by 2 (Condition) by 2 (Type of details) ANOVA on the percentages of false 
remembered condition and false remembered answer for the items that had been encoded 
respectively in reference to the self and in reference to other as repeated measures revealed a 
main effect of group [F(1,34) = 32.31; p < .00001; 2pη = .49], a main effect of type of details 
[F(1,34) = 82.42; p < .000001; 2pη = .71] and a significant group by type of details interaction 
[F(1,34) = 35.82; p < .00001; 2pη = .51]. Other interactions were not significant. A post-hoc 
analysis (Tukey’s test) revealed that the percentages of false remembered condition were 
significantly higher in the AD group than in the HC group for both encoded in reference to the 
self and the items encoded in reference to other (both ps < .001). In contrast, the percentages 
of false remembered answer were similar in both groups. Congruently, the post-hoc analysis 
also revealed that the percentages of false remembered condition was significantly higher than 
the percentages of false remembered answer (across both conditions) in the AD group (both 
ps < .001), while there was no difference in the HC group.  
 
To summarize, our behavioural data revealed that, at the group level, self-reference had an 
effect on global accuracy (SRE), on recollective experience (SRRE) and on contextual 
retrieval (including source memory) in HC participants, but not in AD patients. Therefore, at 














engaged during self-referential encoding and during correct retrieval of items encoded in 
reference to the self.    
 
3.2. Functional Imaging Results 
3.2.1. Encoding: self-referential processing 
No region was found to be significantly more activated in HC than in AD and vice versa 
during judgment of self-relevance compared to judgment of other-relevance (self-relevance 
versus other-relevance) at the selected threshold (pcorrected < .05 or puncorrected < .001) when 
performing direct statistical comparisons (HC > AD and AD > HC). 
A conjunction analysis in the HC and AD groups revealed that both groups activated the 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC; cluster size = 80, Z-value = 3.80, puncorrected value = 
.001, MNI coordinates = -12 42 -4) during judgment of self-relevance compared to judgement 
of other-relevance (self-relevance versus other-relevance). This result is illustrated in Figure 
5. 
 
[Figure 5 about here] 
 
3.2.2. Correlation analysis 
The correlation between brain functional changes in VMPFC (coordinates: -12 42 -4, sphere’s 
radius: 8mm) related to self-relevance judgements and estimation of SRE (difference between 


















3.2.3. Recognition: retrieval of self-related items 
No region was found to be significantly more activated in HC than in AD and vice versa 
during correct recognition of an item that has been processed in reference to the self 
(self_hits) when compared to correct recognition of an item that has been processed in 
reference to other (other_hits) at the selected threshold when performing direct statistical 
comparisons (HC > AD and AD > HC). Similarly, a conjunction analysis in the HC and AD 
yielded no significant result at the selected threshold. It is noteworthy that this lack of 
significance was observed despite the fact that the number of events in each condition 
(self_hits and other_hits) and each participant was sufficient (minimum 18) to perform 
statistical contrast.    
 
To summarize, the analysis of brain functional data revealed that during self-reference 
encoding, both AD and HC participants activated a self-related brain region, the VMPFC. 
However, functional activity in this region during encoding was not related to subsequent 
memory advantage, that is, SRE. The analyses of brain regions directly engaged during 
correct retrieval of items encoded in reference to the self failed to reveal any significant 
results. Next, we performed correlation analyses between SRE and grey matter density.       
 
3.3. Structural Imaging Results 
3.2.1. Group comparison 
In agreement with previous studies, a whole brain statistical group comparison revealed that 
grey matter density was significantly lower in posterior midline structures (i.e. posterior 
cingulate/inferior precuneus) and medial temporal lobes (hippocampus and parahippocampal 















3.2.2 Correlation analysis  
There was no significant correlation between estimations of SRE (difference between Self-
accuracy and Other_accuracy, i.e. memory advantage for items that have been processed in 
reference to the self) and grey matter density in HC participants. 
In AD patients, estimations of SRE were significantly and positively correlated with grey 
matter density in the lateral prefrontal cortex (LPFC) and more particularly, in the right 
middle/superior frontal gyrus (cluster size = 93, Z-value = 4.24, puncorrected value = .001, MNI 
coordinates = 30 45 4). This result is illustrated in Figure 6. 
 
[Figure 6 about here] 
 
To summarize, as expected, the structure of AD patients’ brains is characterized by grey 
matter atrophy in the posterior midline structures and the medial temporal lobe. Moreover, 
reduced and variable SRE is related to grey mater density in the lateral prefrontal cortex in 





At the behavioural level, our results revealed that in healthy older participants, memory 
performance was quantitatively better for self-related items than for other-related items, that 
is, healthy older participants showed a SRE. In contrast, in our sample of mild AD patients, 
memory performance was similar for self-related items and other-related items, showing, at 
the group level, an absence of SRE in AD patients. As expected, in healthy older participants, 














experience (i.e. episodic retrieval) than the retrieval of other-related items, demonstrating a 
SRRE. In contrast, in the AD patients, the retrieval of self-related items and the retrieval of 
other-related items were similarly associated with poor recollective experience. Interestingly, 
familiarity processes for the retrieval of self-related items and other-related items were 
similarly engaged in both healthy older participants and AD patients, suggesting relatively 
preserved familiarity in mild AD. Our analysis of the remembered details revealed that in 
healthy older participants, recollection of information that had been encoded in reference to 
the self was associated with more details from the encoding phase (mainly the source, that is, 
the encoding condition and the answer that the participant had given) than recollection of 
information that had been encoded in reference to the other person. This difference was not 
observed in AD patients. 
 
Consistently with the hypothesis that the specificity and the relational quality of the 
information encoded in reference to the self promote recollection-based processes at retrieval 
in healthy populations, in healthy older participants, the retrieval of self-related information is 
associated with the recollection of details from the encoding context. Importantly, AD 
patients experienced poor recollection for both self-related and other-related information. In 
particular, the retrieval of self-related information in AD patients lacks contextual details. The 
results are also congruent with previous studies that have revealed that the retrieval of 
autobiographical memories in AD patients is deprived of contextual details (Irish, Hornberger, 
et al.,  2011; Irish, Lawlor, et al., 2011; Piolino et al., 2003; Martinelli et al., 2013), 
suggesting that high-order self-related processes are impaired in AD patients.   
 
From a theoretical viewpoint, the current findings suggest that the interaction between self 














System (SMS, Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Conway et al., 2001), the SRE and SRRE 
might reflect the fact that self-relevant information is integrated with related knowledge in the 
autobiographical memory knowledge base, whereas self-unrelated information is not and 
therefore remains as more fragile representations. Similarly, in the framework proposed by 
Northoff et al. (2006), the SRE and SRRE would occur because self-referential processing at 
encoding had activated the core self that further promoted those stimuli to be elaborated in 
higher-order processing, such as autobiographical memory/self. Therefore, the impaired 
interaction between self and memory in AD patients might be conceptualized as the altered 
interaction between the core self and the autobiographical self.   
 
Individual profiles of memory advantage for self-related items revealed that the great majority 
of healthy participants showed a SRE in their memory performance, whereas most of the AD 
patients did not. However, some AD patients did show a memory advantage for self-related 
items. This variability across patients might indicate that despite the frequent impairment of 
interaction between self and memory in AD patients, it appears to be relatively preserved in 
some patients. In a systematic review of qualitative and quantitative studies of the self in 
dementia, Caddell and Clare (2010) have highlighted the divergence of findings in studies that 
have examined the self in AD patients: some findings suggested that it is relatively preserved 
and others indicated that it is impaired. This heterogeneity in findings might partially be due 
to large inter-subjects variability in AD patients’ samples. In our study, this variability did not 
appear to be related to variability in dementia severity in AD patients. The fact that self-
related abilities are not systematically disrupted by the AD pathological process, and are thus 
variable across patients, gave us the opportunity to examine functional and structural brain 















Our functional neuroimaging results showed that AD patients engaged the VMPFC as HC did 
during self-referential judgments. This result differs from previous findings indicating that 
MPFC engagement was not significant in AD patients during self-referential judgments (Ruby 
et al., 2009; Zamboni et al., 2012). This divergence may be explained by methodological 
differences. Previous studies compared brain activity during processing of adjectives in 
reference to the self with brain activity during processing of adjectives in reference to a 
familiar and somewhat intimate other (close relative, friend or caregiver). In our study, the 
comparison was made with processing of adjectives in reference to the self with brain activity 
during processing of adjectives in reference to a non-intimate, famous other (King Albert II or 
Queen Fabiola). Therefore, one might speculate that while AD patients’ neurocognitive 
system may normally differentiate the self from a personally remote other (King or Queen), it 
may not as clearly differentiate the self from a close other. This dysfunction may be related to 
the “permeability of the ego boundaries” that characterizes neuropathologies of the self 
described by Feinberg (2011). Findings in favour of this speculation can be found in Zamboni 
et al.’s study where AD patients had greater activation in the MPFC for judgment of close 
other-relevance than for judgment for self-relevance (direct statistical comparison other > 
self). This interpretation should be investigated further in future studies by directly comparing 
brain activations associated with the processing of items in reference to the self, to a close 
other and to a remote other in AD patients.  
 
Interestingly, the engagement of the VMPFC during self-referential judgments at encoding in 
AD patients did not induce any memory advantage for subsequent episodic retrieval at the 
group level. Particularly, the memory advantage for items that have been processed in 
reference to the self was not related to brain functional changes in the VMPFC during self-














According to Northoff et al. (2006), the VMPFC supports the core self, that is, self-referential 
process per se. The linkage between self-referential stimuli and memory is supported by the 
autobiographical self, which is related to the lateral prefrontal cortex. Accordingly, at the 
brain structural level, our results revealed that the amplitude of the memory advantage for 
self-related items was positively correlated with grey matter density in the right 
middle/superior frontal gyrus (lateral PFC) in AD patients. Two meta-analyses of fMRI 
studies (Wicker et al., 2003; Whitfield-Gabrieli et al., 2011) revealed that brain activity in this 
region is increased during resting state in healthy young participants suggesting that this 
region may be engaged during internally-oriented processes. Interestingly, this region has also 
been found to be related to episodic memory retrieval (Lepage et al., 2000; Kim, in press; 
Skinner and Fernandez, 2007) or recollection-based controlled retrieval (Gallo et al.; 2009). 
Altogether, these findings suggest that the LPFC (particularly in the right hemisphere) plays a 
role in self-related processes and high-order (controlled) memory-related processes. 
Therefore, one may hypothesize that variations in the memory advantage for self-related items 
is related to variations in high-order abilities that monitor the interaction between self and 
memory in AD patients, in line with Nothoff et al.’s hypothesis.  
 
No significant correlation was found between grey matter density and the amplitude of SRE 
in HC participants. This does not necessarily mean that the MPFC or LPFC do not play a role 
in memory advantage for self-related information in these participants. Rather, the absence of 
results may suggest that variations in grey matter density and/or amplitude of SRE is 
insufficient in these participants to yield a significant correlation. 
 
Since our behavioural results suggest that the retrieval of information that has been processed 














information in HC participants but not in AD patients, one might expect brain activation 
related to self_hits to be more associated with brain regions supporting episodic memory (and 
self-related processes such as the PCC) in the HC group than in the AD group. However, 
statistical group comparisons of brain activity related to correct retrieval of items that have 
been processed in reference to the self (self_hits compared to other_hits) yielded no 
significant results. In a previous fMRI study of memory retrieval in HC participants and AD 
patients, we found that despite lower recollection-based performance than HC participants, 
AD patients activated the PCC as HC participants. Connectivity analyses in this previous 
study revealed, however, that functional connectivity of the PCC during episodic retrieval was 
impaired in AD patients (Genon, Collette, Feyers et al., 2013). This suggests that brain 
functioning supporting recollection-related processes is complex and that impaired 
recollection function in AD patients might be related to subtle functional changes (probably in 
terms of connectivity) within a large-scale brain network. Therefore, univariate analyses in 
line with the assumption of functional segregation and targeting regionally specific effects of 
particular items in the brain may not be the optimal analysis to examine complex function 
such as recollection in AD patients. In addition, our current behavioural results suggest that 
retrieval of other-related information is also associated with recollection-related processes in 
both groups (although to a smaller extent than self-related information in HC). Therefore, it 
may be the case that differential functioning in the recollection-related brain network for 
self_hits and other_hits is not sufficient to reach the significance threshold with a univariate 
analysis.   
                           
In summary, our study provides new behavioural and imaging findings on the interaction 
between self and memory in AD patients. At the behavioural level, whereas the retrieval of 














healthy older participants, the retrieval of self-related information in AD patients is, as the 
retrieval of other kinds of information, low and poorly associated with recollection processes. 
At the cerebral level, memory performance for retrieving self-related information does not 
depend on MPFC activation at encoding (during self-referential judgments). Rather, the 
decreased memory advantage for self-related information in AD is associated with impaired 
grey matter density in the LPFC, a brain region that may support high-order processes 
involved in the interaction between self and memory. In conclusion, these findings suggest 
that even if patients with Alzheimer dementia engage a self-related region when performing 
self-referential judgment, the retrieval of self-related memories is quantitatively and 
qualitatively impaired. 
  
More generally, many patients with AD do not fully acknowledge the cognitive and 
behavioural changes that modify the person they used to be (a condition called anosognosia; 
for a review, see e.g. Agnew & Morris, 1998; Mograbi et al., 2009). According to Morris & 
Mograbi (in press), anosognosia in AD may be related to impaired memory processing of self-
related information. From this perspective, the current study suggests that, whereas in healthy 
older people, the connection of newly encountered information to the self promotes 
subsequent high quality memories, in AD patients this phenomenon is modified leading to 
poor memory for recently encountered self-related information. Our data also suggest that 
perturbations in lateral prefrontal regions (in particular in the right hemisphere) might play a 
role in these modifications. Given that anosognosia in AD patients has been found to be 
related to abnormalities in lateral prefontal regions (Reed et al., 1993; Sedaghat et al., 2012) 
and to impaired autobiographical memory performance (Naylor & Clare, 2008), one might 
speculate that impaired interaction between self and memory related to perturbations in lateral 














test this hypothesis by examining the relationship between anosognosia and memory 
performance for recently self-related encountered information in AD patients.      
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Figure 1. Encoding (left) and recognition (right) procedures that served for the self-
recognition task and the self-recollection tasks. Screens were separated by a fixation cross not 
represented here.  
 
Figure 2. Accuracy scores (percentages of hits minus false alarm) for items encoded in 
reference to the self and in reference to other. Standard errors are represented by errors bars. 
*Self compared to Other p < .05.  
 
Figure 3. Percentages of R (Remember responses minus false alarm) and F (familiarity 
estimates based on Know responses minus false alarm) for items encoded in reference to the 
self and in reference to other. Standard errors are represented by errors bars. *Self compared 
to Other p < .05. 
 
Figure 4. Percentages of remembered details for items encoded in reference to the self and in 
reference to other. Standard errors are represented by errors bars. *Self compared to Other p < 
.05. 
 
Figure 5. Brain region commonly activated by HC and AD group (conjunction analysis) 
during self-relevance judgements (self-relevance vs other-relevance). p < .001 uncorrected for 
the whole brain volume.   
 
Figure 6. Positive correlation between grey matter density and estimation of SRE in AD 




















21 (10/11) 21 (12/9) 
Age (years) 
 
76.0 (4.9) 76.1 (6.0) 
Years of education 
 
10.8 (2.5) 10.8 (3.5) 
GDS scores 
 
2.7 (2.4) 2.8 (2.5) 
Mattis scores* 139.1 (3.1) 
 
126.6 (7.7) 
MMSE  23.6 (2.0) 
 
AD: Alzheimer disease. HC: Healthy controls. GDS: Geriatric Depression Scale. MMSE: 
Mini Mental State Examination. Values are expressed as mean and (standard deviation) for 





















38.4 (18.6)* 35.2 (15.4)* 77.6 (12.6)* 
HC 
 
75.6 (11.3) 61.2 (17.4) 89.2 (5.9) 
Accuracy scores are expressed as percentage of hits minus percentage of false alarm. CR; 
correct rejections. Data are presented as means ± standard deviation. *The percentage is 




















35.5 (20.8)* 32.1 (14.3)* 78.8 (14.8)* 
HC 
 
75.1 (14.0) 59.5 (20.7) 94.5 (6.1) 
Accuracy scores are expressed as percentage of hits (computations of Remember and Know 
responses) minus percentage of false alarm. CR; correct rejections. Data are presented as 
means ± standard deviation. *The percentage is significantly lower in the AD group than in 
the HC group at p < .01. 
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